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FESTINA LENTE.
It is a common-place saying that- we live in a period not
only of amazing accomplishment, but of transition that is rapid,
colossal, world wide. The changes from the old to the new in
the Far East, as well as the near \Vest, are notable, yes wonderful, in international relations, in government, in the c6nduct.
of public and also private business, in the economical management of affairs which concern the general 'welfare as well as
those which affect domestic interests. The- advance in physics,
the study of the laws and purposes of Nature, discoveries and
inventions, and novel applications of known forces have altered
the conceptions and the habits of millions of mankind.
Majestic floating palaces traverse the oceans under whose
waves stretch cables flashing messages from country to country
and through the air above the water, the wireless telegraph transmits words of need. of help, of cheer, of warning, of every
meaning, from and to those, who are separated by distances of
even thousands of miles. Mountains are no longer impassable
barriers for their hearts of rock are pierced by steel tracks
over which passengers and commodities are propelled with
celerity from place to place, from nation to nation. Even the
long-considered problem of aerial navigation seems to be nearing
practical solution. Chemistry, too, in its sphere of development, has made and is making a progress that appears magical,
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transmuting base elements into either ether or fluids more beneficial. to mankind than the gold sought by the alchemists of old.
The "/strange things" are becoming familiar things.
In accord with all the mutations that are actual, visible andtangible, have arisen questions, theories, and speculations in
religion, in metaphysics, in regard to the rights of man, as man,.
in public and private law. Thinking minds are grappling with
problems and consciences are quickened. It is an age of unrest
but not of pessimism or gloom.
Changes in the law are considered; the exigencies of modem
conditions must be met. The inquiry is ever heard- Can settled
principles apply and govern, or must new ones be sought, arid: if
found, prevail? The conservative lawyer, wv,-ho respects and follows the -precedents and decisions of the courts of last resort, is
inevitably less conspicuous than the .iconoclast whose superior
genius breaks into fragments and casts away both the unwritten
law and the statutory tablets of the past. Or research may unearth
long buried and worthless arguments and. they may be scoured
and polished or veneered with modem lingo and exhibited as
new. Yet in truth, historical study, noble in motive as well as
erudite, may and often does ascertain, and publish valuable and
long disregarded propositions, which convince the reason and
exhibit sound learning, and whose re-adoption results in the attainment of, the one worthy object of legal thought, the administration of justice. Bad law is replaced by -good law.
There is, however, a contrary and powerful current in the
progress of the law. There are men who have a penchant for
writing statutes,--a legion of them. Hence there is an epidemic
of code making with no legal anti-toxin in sight. The mind
is dazed by the plethora of books, statutes, reports, periodicals
and essays with themes and suggestions in number like the
sands of the seashore. Everything "goes," from the' logic of
the theorist to the vagaries of the dilettanti. Sciolist and
scientist pass side by side in the madding crowd. The current never ceasing, ever increasing, is sweeping on. The
tendency is towards a priori reasoning, when law should be a
growth, developed by the needs and conditions of those who
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are affected by it, not an exact science, uniform and uncompromising, either physical or metaphysical-.
The sources of our common law, Anglo Saxon; Norman
and Roman, in judicial decisions, in ancient customs, in English and American statutes, in local needs, in the development
of communities, in the exigencies of men, are so many and 'so
varied that to trace them in their sources and in their streams
has been the study of able and single-minded scholars, historical,
legal and philosophical. Is law a deductive science wherein
numerous rules are deduced from a few given axioms? Or can
it be deemed an inductive science with genus, species and differentia formulated from many illustrations by the -inference that
what has been observed or established in regard to a part may,
on the ground of analogy, be affirmed or received of the whole
to which it belongs?
The judgments of human minds and the underlying -basic
conceptions of men differ.- How often do judges of learning,
logic and love of justice, lock horns in the determination of
propositions of law or in their application to the facts of particular cases. The differences are found, not only in the efforts
to solve great problems, but also in less important contentions.
As stated in the introduction of Pollock and Maitland's History
of the English Common Law,--"The matter of 'legal science is
not an ideal result of ethical and political analysis; it is the actual result of facts of human nature and history"
Separated from all academic discussion and the seclusi6n
of the cloister, are the men of activity in practical occupations.
Contracts'are made, kept or broken: torts are, or are alleged
to be, committed: contentions are many and they are inevitable
in the multitude of human transactions; courts must exist; judges
must hear arguments: controversies must be determined.
In the report on Civil and Common Law of the Committee
on the Judiciary, set out in the appendix of the first volume
of California State Reports at page 590, occurs the following
statement:
"Such is the wonderful complexity of human affairs,a complexity which must always increase more and more in
proportion to the advance of commerce, of civilization, and of

. 206

FESTINX. LENTE

refinement-that of the immense multitude of questions, which
are brought before courts for adjudication, but very few arise
under or are dependent upon, or can be controlled by, Constitutions or express statutory laws."
There is an honest belief, cherished by many legal scholars,
that the principles of the common law are based upon sound
reason and are broad enough, and, so to say, malleable enough,
to apply to questions that arise under present conditions. .As this
article is upon an emergency call, "to be prepared, if possible,
in two days," familiar illustrations are recalled and cited in
support of the belief just stated.
Of Coggs v. Barnard, Lord Raymond, 9o9, it is said:
"One of the most celebrated ever decided in Westminster
Hall, and justly so, since the elaborate judgment of Lord Holt,
contains the first well-ordered exposition of the English law of
Bailments."
The decisions of Lord Mansfield, mentioned and commented
upon in. Campbell's Lives of the Chief Justices, Vol. 3, at page
302, et seq., show that, (though, true it is that some of these
have been criticized), his moulding, perhaps making, of commercial law settled general rules with precision and upon sound
principles. In the words of his biographer: "He materially improved the jurisprudence of his country."
To illustrate further, reference may be made to a case much
discussed by Pennsylvania lawyers, viz., Sanderson v. Coal Co.,
86 Pa. 4oi; 102 Pa. 37o; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson,
113 Pa. 126, a case upon debatable questions of rights and dam-

ages,- in which intricate questions were discussed and finally determined, though by a divided court.
One more instance may be given under the present limitations of time and space: Commonwealth v. Shortall, 2o6 Pa.
165, in which Justice Mitchell defines the qualified martial law,
and its effect; which existed where the civil courts and other
agencies of the law are open for the ascertainment or vindication of private rights or the other functions of government.
These decisions are referred to simply to show the adaptability
of the common law. No attempt is herein made to discuss them.
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A part of the argument in favor of the common law as
made in the report of the California Committee, above alluded
to, is worthy of quotation (page 59 ):
"We know it to be a favorite theme of some men that the
entire laws of a community, regulating every variety of business, and defining and providing the penalty for every grade
of crime, may be and ought to be, reduced within the compass
of a common sized spelling book-so that every man might become his own lawyer and judge-so that the farmer; the'artisan, the merchant, with this vade inecunt in his pocket, at
the plough, in the workshop or in the counting-house, might
be enabled, at a moment's warning, to open its leaves and point
directly to the very page, section, and line, which would elucidate
the darkest case, solve the most abstruse legal problem, clearly
define his rights, and prescribe the exact remedy for his wrongs.
It is scarcely necessary to say that all such notions are but the
chimeras of ignorance and folly, or the fancies of a slirit
more reprehensible and more to be deprecated than ignorance
and folly conjoined. The features and forms of men are no
more diverse than their minds--and their business transactions
are as ever-varying as their mental and moral characters. One
man views the same object, whether physical or, moral, or legal,
in a different light from another-no two men ever do the same
thing in precisely the same way-perhaps no tw6 cases ever arose
without a shade of difference between them; and until you can
cast the forms and features of all men in the same mould.
reduce the operations of their minds to the same uniform level,
and endow each individual with the same moral sense and the
same intellectual faculties, you may expect nothing less than
diversity in their modes of business, in their bargains and sales,
their contracts. conveyances and testaments, and their manifold devices for the perpetration of fraud and crime. To undertake by statute or by code, to establish a just and accurate rule
for every contingency of human avarice and of human passions,
and for all the endless phases of varied life, is to essay a task
which never yet was accomplished-a task which, until the
Almighty shall change the nature and attributes of man, must
forever remain equally impracticable and absurd. In truth, all
the provisions of constitutions, and statutes and codes are but
pebbles on the sea shore-the vast ocean of legal science lies
beyond.-"
Let us briefly consider some further objections to codes.
The doctrine of stare decisis was commended by Judge Shars-
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wood in Schafer v. Farmer*-.and Mechanics Bank, 59 Pa., 144,
in these words:
"To overrule these cases and .establish any other rule would
lead to worse consequences by creating the feeling that the
point was still unsettled. 'The traditional experience of the
courts,' as has been said by Lord Eldon, 'does not furnish a
wiser maxim than that which is contained in the short precept
stare decisis'." I Bligh, 24.
Two *striking instances in which it was followed may be
given: In the: case of Candee v. Lord, 2 New York 269, in
which the actual decision of the original Court of Appeals
simply dismissed an appeal from an order of the chancellor.
Judge Gardiner. who wrote the opinion, argued elaborately in
favor of the proposition that "a judgment obtained without
fraud or collusion is conclusive evidence, in suits between creditors in relation to the property of the debtor, of the indebtedness
of the latter and the amount of the indebtedness." The syllabus
in the report gives this quotation as an abstract of the decision.
Subsequently the proposition was attacked in Nicholas v. Lord,
193 New York, 388.' In the opinion, Vatin, J., said, referring"
to the case of Candee v. Lord (page 394):
"If that case stood alone we might not feel at liberty to
depart from the rule that a judgment recovered against a grantor
years after he parted with all his title, is not binding upon the
grantee, wlho was neither a party nor privy thereto; but it does
nlot stand alone. For nearly sixty years it has-been treated by
the courts as establishing the law as stated in the head note.
It has been cited repeatedly by This court as authority for what
Judge Gardiner wrote and Judge Comstock reported." (Citing
nine cases) and further on page 396:
"Thus the opinion of Judge Gardiner, even if it did not
express the law when it was written, has now become the law
by adoption and we cannot announce a different rule, for the
question is not an open one."
As another example see Taylor v. Young, 71 Pa. 81, reaffirming the practice upon two returns of nihil habet in acThe writer is indebted to L. H. Beers, Esq.. of counsel for the appellant,
for a reierencc to this case.
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tions of scire facias sur mortgage. How much clearer the procedure was under this case than under section .ioof the Service
Act (Pa.) of July 9, i90 i , (P. L. 614) with its requirements
of the affidavit as to the real owner of the land charged and specifications for service, going so far now that there is a contention
that a ft. fa. and vcnd. ,-r., issued upon a judgment' confessed on
a bond accompanying- a mortgage, are 'within the purview of

that tenth section. This would be an instance of judicial legislation, a sci. fa. being the writ to begin an action and a D. S. B.
being final and definite, unless opened, strick# off, or vacated.
It cannot be maintained, however, thatfin erroneous decision
should not be reversed simply because it has been made. Broom's
Legal Maxims, *152, gives this extract from Bacon's Essay "Of.
Innovations:" "A froward retention of custom is as turbulent
a thing as an innovation; and they that reverence too much
old times are buta scorn to the new."
The only averment here is that the common law may and
does cover a wide field without statutory assistance.
A decision based upon principles of law is reached after
full discussion by counsel in the lower and higher courts and
after the members of the court of appellate jurisdiction, having heard argument, have consulted with each other. On the
other hand, it is rare that proposed* enactments can be threshed
out point by point with the same thought and ardor as are cases
actually in court. Further, the remarks of F. Vaughn Hawkins,
Esq., (Thayer's Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, App. C. p.
585) on principles of legal interpretation of wills, are pertinent
to the drafting of statutes.
"The failure of
tion may take place
of language in itself,
definite signification.

language adequately to convey the intenfrom three causes: first, the imperfection
considered as a code of signals, its want of
and its inadequacy to the expression of

every phase of thought: secondly, from the improper and unskilful use of language by the writer: thirdly, from the limited nature of the human mind, incapable of foreseeing all contingencies to which the expression of its intent may require to be
adapted. especially if the interpretation of the writing tikes place
at a period long after that at which it was composed."
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Add either of these two hypotheses: If a proposed enactnient is meant to be declarative of existing law, then there is
the difficulty of diversity of opinion on the question of what
such existing law is; or, if meant to he cnstructike, then the
question arises what is a just and accurate rule to provide for
the contingencies for which new provision is sought?
A further objection is the delay in getting a final decisive
interpretation of an act. A notable example is found in a single
point of practice under the Statement Act (Pa.) of May 25,
1887, (P. L. 271) whether service of a copy of a statement
made prior to the service of the summons in an action of assumpsit is sufficient to entitle plaintiff to judgment against the
defendant for want of an affidavit of defense. See Commonwealth v. Bangs, 22 Pa. Super. Ct. 403 (1963), Gorman v.
Hibernian B. & L. Assn., 154 Pa. 133 (893); Loeb v. Allen,
32 Pa. Super. Ct. 137 (19o6).
Again there is the danger of attempting constructive legislation by those who are purely theorists. The result may be
reputation for-the writer, for writers are said to make the law.
In fact it comes in chunks. but acaaemic, inapt, confused and
confusing to those who have to be governed by it, who indeedl
are too often not only "at sea" but "in deep water"-Rari itantes
in gurgitevasto.
The statement of judge Gibson in Shacklett's Appeal, 14
Pa. 326 in deciding that foreign attachment executed upon
real estate should bind the same against judgment creditors,
when the statute named only purchasers and mortgagees, upon
the ground that a judgment creditor, though not within the letter,
is within the equity of the enactment, should be considered by
those who are trying to make codes. H6 said: "The clause,
however, is but another proof that every codification of the law
must necessarily be lame and imperfect, though executed by
the ablest hand."
Reference is also made to the sentences of Mr. Justice Dean,
in Waters v. Wolf. 162 Pa. 153 (see page 167), concluding with
the terse expression "Laws seem to be born full grown about as
often as men are." How weighty, in view of these difficulties.
are the words of Lord Poweii after the decision in the great case
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of the Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 612, given by.
Mr. Bigelow in a note on page 7 of his book on Bills, Notes and
Checks: "Law should follow business."
In view of the unsettling effect of new legislation and apart,
moreover, from forensic contentions, it is a truism that a large
part of the duty of a lawyer in actual practice is consultation,
the advisory guidance of clients in advance of their engagements in busihess or their entrance upon some line of conduct
Advice must be as diverse as the purposes and plans of those
who seek it. It is responsible and should be reasonably accurate.
A referee or a master or a judge decides upon the validity of
things already done, of conditions that are fixed; advocates
argue questions based on shown facts; in matters of advice prior
to action there is need of safety, of repose. Those who have
not the experience of trying to help clients, who rely upon
their protective counsel for direction in matters of vital importance before action, cannot feel with the same sensitiveness
the risk of altering laws as can one who as a pilot dreads the
changes of the course. He craves.certainty, not guesswork.
As a concrete specimen of a very careful endeavor. to codify,
let us glance at the Negotiable Instruient Law, the fruit in
England of the study of a learned digester of English cases, of
a select conmiittee of merchants, bankers and lawyers, of a committee of the House of Lords; and in America, of a sub-committee of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It is
submitted that it has adopted, in. the many states in which it has
been enacted, the English law, of which it was declarative, to
no practical advantage and has led to confusion. The concluding word of the late Dean Ames, who was facile prihweps
among non-practitioners, is: "the writer retains his conviction
that it is wiser to have no code at all than to adopt the Negotiable
Instrument Law in its present form. If, on the other hand, the
law should be amended as suggested in this paper, the sooner
it is enacted throughout the Union the better." (See Brannen
on N. I. L. p. 176.)
This suggests a further thought, that parts of codes after
promulgation are often altered by subsequent amendment. To
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illustrate: Section 137 2 of the Act (Pa.) of May i6 19o, reads
as follows:
"Where a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for acceptance
destroys the same, or refuses within twenty-four hours after
such delivery, or within such further period as the holder may.
allow, to return the bill accepted or non-accepted to the holder,
he will be deemed to have accepted the same."
The Supreme Court in Wisner v. Bank, 2o, Pa. 21 interpreted that section to mean that the failure or neglect of a
drawee to whom a bill is delivered for acceptance -toreturn the
bill, accepted or non-accepted, to the holder within tventy-four
hours after delivery makes the drawee an accetor of the bill.
And a check is a bill of exchange under section 185 of the act.
Thereupon an-act (April 27, 1909, [Pa.] P. L2 6o.) 'was
passed amending section 137 of ihe Act of i9oI, as follows:
"Provided, That the mere retention of such a bill by the
drawee, until iti return has been demanded, will -notamount to
an acceptance; and provided further, That the provisions of this
section shall not apply to checks."
thus striking out the "provision as to checks, but leaving bills subject to section 137 with the modification that demand for a return
has been made. Compare First National Bank of Northumberland v. McMichael, io6 Pa. 46o, in regard to inference of acceptance from delay for the law prior to the Negotiable Instrument Act-as to checks.
A further illustration at hand, is this: The Mechanics'
Lien Act (Pa.) of June 14, I9o, 3 (P. L. 431) and the amendnient thereto by the Act (Pa.) of April 17, 1905 (P. L. 172)
furnish exhibits of amendments which unsettle instead of settling.
The eleventh section of the original act contained eleven averments to be made in the claim filed. The amendment gives three.
Further, an affidavit by the sub-contractor was required in the
original eleventh section. This was omitted in the amendment.
On the other hand, the eighth section of the original act, which
'Grateful acknowledgment is made to Professor Crawford D. Hening
for the 137th sec. and the citations.
This act has been fully discussed elsewhere and so is briefly cited.
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was construed by tce Supreme Court in McVey v. Hoffman,
(223 Pa. 125) to be a condition precedent to the right of a subcontractor to file a lien has not been repealed. Must ,such affidavit of the written notice by the sub-contractor be now set forth
in the claim filed? (See Bametzrieder v. Canevin, 44 Pa. Super.
Ct. 18)
Again, the 32nd section of the original act provided for
a form of sci. fa., with a notice to file an affidavit of defense
within fifteen days. By the amendment, that section is repealed:
does the 33rd section still stand which'allowed service 'of a sci.
fa. to be made at any time within three monfls from the date
on which it is issued, whereas the form of the writ of scirefacias
given by the amendment specifically makes the writ returnable
"on the first Monday ofnext"?
In this entire article, illustrations ready at hand, necessarily,
have been used, but many more' might be found. 'These, 'however, are enough to exemplify these particular objections to,
codification. It is believed that the points herein barely mentioned apply as well to projects to make uniform laws in separate states of the Union. If it be argued that such uniformity
is desirable and also that in the common ,law there has been a
vast diversity and conflict of decisions by courts of different
states, it may be said:
(i) That the purpose, the intent and .the supposed benefit
of uniform legislation for as many states as may enact a particular code are specifically to enforce certainty and avoid conflict; but, that they are liable to failure because of dissimilar interpretation of the same words by separate courts, words intended
to be absolutely clear and definite in meaning by the producers
and sponsors of the statutes: see for instance the opinion of Von
Moschzisker, J., in Raken v. Henry, 16 Pa. Dist. Rep. 2o8, in
which he considered some opposing decisions upon the right of
one who takes a note of a third party merely as collateral for an
antecedent or pre-existing debt without any new consideration
passing at the time. Is such a person a holder for value or is
he not?
(2) That individual communities have exigencies, customs
and laws which ought not to be wantonly broken in upon for the
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sake of non-residents-a large majority injured for. the supposed
good of a small minority.
(3) "It is the law that the relation of "the various departments of a city government is one of agency defined by
statute and that all persons who deal with them are bound to take
notice of the measure of their authority and that every act or
contract that exceeds it is invalid." Per Hare, P. J. in 17 W.
N. C. 531. If, therefore, a non-resident in such a case who contracts with a municipality is subjected to local law, is it any
greater h'ardship for a non-resident of a particular state to be
bound by the laws of that state?
The suggestions of this article are not, cannot be, and are
not intended to be exhaustive; nor do they lead to the conclusion
that the legal maxim "Oninis innovatio pluts nozitate perturbat
quam utilitate prodcst" is to be literally and slavishly observed.
For example, it may be hoped that there will be great -benefit
from the enactment of uniformi state laws applying to social and
industrial questions that affect the welfare of people in all parts
of our country. Legislative action, however, should be based upon
demonstrated need, careful study of the proposed remedy in substance, of its constitutionality, of the meaning of every word used
in a proposed act, with a careful examination of existing decisions
as well as statutes. Knowledge of law as well as of the English
language is required and the pen of one who thinks he has a
facility for legislative expression should indeed "make haste
slowly." This caution should also be observed in accordance with
the statement in Broom's Legal Maxims No. 15o, "So, likewise
with respect to matters which do not affect existing rights or
properties to any great degree, but tend principally to influence
the future transactions of mankind, it is generally more important
that the rule of law should be settled than that it should be theoretically correct."
John IV. Patton.
Law School,
University of Pennsylvania.

